“Best Execution, Price Transparency, and Linkages: Protecting the Investor Interest” by Levitt, Arthur
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 78 
Issue 2 The Changing Structure of Securities Regulation 
January 2000 
“Best Execution, Price Transparency, and Linkages: Protecting the 
Investor Interest” 
Arthur Levitt 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arthur Levitt, “Best Execution, Price Transparency, and Linkages: Protecting the Investor Interest”, 78 
WASH. U. L. Q. 513 (2000). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/7 
This F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the 
Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
513 
“BEST EXECUTION, PRICE TRANSPARENCY, 
AND LINKAGES: PROTECTING THE  
INVESTOR INTEREST” 
ARTHUR LEVITT* 
Thank you very much for that warm introduction. I must say, there are 
few things that make me more nervous than speaking in front of Joel 
Seligman. There is perhaps no other person who knows more about the 
history of our securities markets and the SEC than Joel. I’ve often thought 
that if the wing of the Library of Congress containing the nation’s historical 
documents on our markets was to burn down, the first thing our government 
would do is call up Joel, with pen in hand, and ask politely, “Could you just 
start from the beginning?” 
But when Dean Seligman looks back on these formative times for our 
markets, I think it’s safe to say that there will be plenty for him to write 
about. Today, our capital markets are experiencing change at a pace and on a 
scale we’ve never seen before—driven by the forces of technology and 
competition. New market entrants, new ways to invest, and new investors are 
changing the face and form of America’s markets 
Seven months ago, I talked about a regulatory framework that I believe 
will continue to give competition the space and sustenance to flourish. In it, 
multiple market centers compete with one another to produce faster and 
cheaper executions of securities transactions. A few months later, I addressed 
a broker’s duty of best execution, which serves as a guardian of competition 
among our markets. Last week in Chicago, I talked about the two remaining 
pillars of our National Market System: transparency and linkages. 
Today I want to revisit the components of best execution, transparency, 
and linkages, but I want to approach them from a slightly different angle. 
Often, when we discuss concepts such as “trade execution” or “price 
visibility” or “order interaction,” it’s easy to get mired in highly technical, 
even puzzling details. These are not necessarily straightforward concepts, 
and meaningful debates about their impact on our markets often demand 
rigorous analysis. It’s easy to lose sight of what’s at the very core of these 
principles—and that’s serving the investor interest. Execution quality takes 
some effort to consider, but it is more than worth it for most investors. 
Best execution is the duty of brokers to obtain the best execution 
reasonably available for their customers. Put another way, it is a pledge by 
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brokers that they will act in the best interest of their customers. 
Transparency, on the other hand, is when prices can be seen across all the 
different market centers and exchanges. This makes it possible for brokers to 
locate the best price in the overall market. And linkages provide a way for 
brokers to access those prices and execute trades. It does little good to see the 
best price if there is no way of accessing it. 
The working confluence of these three principles fosters a marketplace 
that serves both investors and efficient capital formation. But as is often the 
case when theory is tested in the more rigorous medium of reality, new 
challenges and unexpected obstacles arise. Best execution, price 
transparency, and effective linkages become more complex when we 
consider both today’s market developments and the diversity of America’s 
investors. 
BEST EXECUTION 
When someone talks about achieving the “best” execution of a trade, 
what exactly does that mean? The truth is, best execution encompasses a 
number of factors, starting with the price of the execution and the 
opportunity for price improvement—that is, finding a better price somewhere 
in the open market. Other factors include speed and the likelihood that the 
order will actually be executed. For institutional investors, anonymity and 
liquidity might be overriding concerns. In any case, the quality of execution 
must always be viewed from the investor’s perspective—not the firm’s. 
At the same time, increased competition among market centers has 
provided new alternatives as well. Some market centers guarantee immediate 
automated execution of trades. Others promise the possibility of getting the 
investor a better price than the market is offering. Where one trading 
platform might provide anonymity for large orders, another will promise 
“optimal” executions by searching many market centers for very specific 
opportunities. 
As you can imagine, all of these dynamics must be balanced. For 
example, it goes without saying that, at some point, a customer will sacrifice 
some chance of a better price for speed, and visa versa. You won’t find many 
investors willing to wait a week to get a small amount of price improvement 
if they think the market for that security may move quickly. On the other 
hand, I suspect most retail investors would willingly sacrifice 5 or 10 seconds 
in order to get a chance for a better price. 
Now, some firms have told us that execution speed is the most important 
factor in their routing decisions. But far too many of these firms have not 
conducted regular and rigorous reviews of execution alternatives—reviews to 
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determine whether there are other places that offer faster executions, or 
executions that are just as fast but with a greater likelihood for price 
improvement. Firms must be proactive in engaging their customers and 
ascertaining their needs. 
Now, I’m sure that some in the industry think that the Commission has a 
myopic, picayune focus on price improvement. “What’s the big deal?” they 
ask, “if the difference is only 1/16th?” Well, consider these numbers. If your 
order is executed at one increment away from the best price -- 1/16th—that’s 
$62.50 out of your pocket on a 1000 share order. That’s more than four times 
the commission that many on-line brokers advertise today. To an investor, 
that’s real money. 
Firms must consider and analyze execution alternatives that go beyond 
just the firm’s economic self-interest. Some firms are currently asking the 
different market centers for execution quality statistics, including speed of 
execution and percentage of price improvement. Others route “test trades” to 
gather the same data. I applaud these efforts. They are encouraging first steps 
on the road toward better markets—markets tailored to the needs of 
customers. 
TRANSPARENCY, LIMIT ORDERS, AND THE PRICE SETTING MECHANISM  
Even if brokers establish very clearly the investing objectives of their 
customers, brokers must be able to see the best prices in the market if they 
are to truly achieve best execution. As more and more market centers 
compete for customer orders, it’s imperative that prices are visible to every 
broker or dealer in every market. 
But transparency does more than just allow brokers and investors to view 
prices—it serves an important function in the price-setting process. How 
does transparency impact prices? One of the ways is though it’s most 
powerful agent—the limit order. 
There are essentially two types of customer orders: market orders and 
limit orders. When an investor places a market order, a broker executes the 
trade at the best current price in the market. In this way, investors can be 
viewed as price-takers. In contrast, limit orders—orders to buy and sell a 
security at a specified price or better—enable investors to compete for better 
prices than the market is offering. Limit orders, in other words, allow 
investors to be price-setters. And that’s a unique opportunity. Makes you 
wish we had limit orders for buying gasoline. 
Limit orders serve a critical market function by helping reveal the supply 
and demand for a security. More simply put, they show how many shares of 
a particular stock customers are willing to buy or sell, and at what price. As a 
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result, limit orders increase the information available to the overall market 
and allow all market participants to better determine prices. 
But limit orders have done more than just promote price discovery; they 
have begun to level the playing field between dealers and the investing 
public. There was a time when investors had no choice but to accept the price 
set by dealers in the OTC market. But through the use of limit orders, 
investors now have become an integral part of the price setting process, 
allowing prices to be determined by the forces of competition. 
In 1997, the Commission decided to foster this kind of price competition 
by enacting the Limit Order Display Rule. It simply stated that dealers 
holding customer limit orders that are equal to or better than the market price 
must either execute the orders immediately or display them to the market. 
The point of the rule was to make the most motivated buyers and sellers 
visible to the broader market—increasing the chance that those who stood up 
and improved the price would be rewarded. 
Since then, the investing public has benefited from greater competition 
and more fully realized price transparency. It is now clear that the Order 
Handling Rules—which include the Limit Order Display Rule—are largely 
responsible for narrowing spreads by over 30%. Most of that decrease in 
spreads—the difference between a dealer’s bid and offer—is due to the 
display of customer limit orders. 
I believe that our markets should embrace a broader, deeper transparency 
than what exists in our markets today. Currently, most market participants 
can see only the “top” of a market’s limit order book—that is, the single best 
quote available. But this says very little about the rest of the supply and 
demand for a particular security. In many respects, when it comes to price 
transparency today, seeing the top of the book is like seeing the tip of an 
iceberg—and having no idea how much rests below. 
With the impending changeover from fractions to decimal pricing, and 
quote increments move to pennies, this top layer will represents an even 
thinner slice of the total buying or selling interest for that security. In fact, in 
going to pennies, market participants could now see a sliver of customer 
demand that is about 1/6-th the size currently visible. In many respects, 
decimalization makes greater transparency a market imperative. 
Important and encouraging steps are being taken by our markets. The 
NYSE has proposed making the specialist’s book of limit orders visible to its 
members and the broader public. The Nasdaq has submitted a plan to create a 
SuperMontage that will aggregate and display orders and quotes of all 
participating market makers—not only at the current best prices, but several 
increments away from the best price. And some ECNs already make their 
entire book visible to the public via the Internet on a real-time basis. These 
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are all forward looking initiatives that answer the investor’s call for greater 
transparency and more efficient pricing. 
But we can do more. Last week, I called for all market participants to 
move toward open books across all markets. Now is the time for a voluntary 
private sector initiative in this important area—one that does not require 
major systems engineering. 
If our markets—exchanges, dealers, and ECNs—were to make their limit 
order books available to the public, vendors could consolidate this data and 
package it in a form that would be most useful to their customers. 
Presumably, nearly all market participants would want to purchase this data 
and broker-dealers would make it available to investors—including retail 
investors. 
Of course, some customers would prefer not to have their limit orders 
displayed, and I am not suggesting they be forced to do so. But the choice 
should rest with investors—not market intermediaries. As an investor 
bidding on the price of a security, wouldn’t you want to know how many 
people want to buy or sell that same security, and how much they are willing 
to pay or sell it for? The ability of all investors to see the depth of supply and 
demand in any stock would be a giant step towards a true National Market 
System. 
LINKAGES 
But there is another crucial component to ensuring that investors receive 
the best possible prices that the open market has to offer—and that is 
effective linkages between markets. Even if all market participants could see 
the best quotes across all market centers, there must be a way for 
customers—most commonly through their brokers—to access those different 
markets quickly and efficiently. 
If quote prices are changing rapidly, often the market where the broker 
routes an order no longer offers the best price by the time that order arrives. 
Intermarket linkages help ensure that the order still gets the best price at the 
point of sale. What’s more, intermarket linkages also help promote price 
equilibrium across markets, thereby enhancing our markets’ efficiency. 
Historically, the Commission has played an active, but limited role in 
promoting better intermarket linkages. The linkages that the Commission has 
insisted upon have been basic connections that protect customers from 
pricing disparities – that is, different prices in different markets for the same 
security. And while the SEC has prodded, it has not dictated the details of the 
linkage. In considering reforms to the current linkage system, we should be 
mindful of certain fundamentals. 
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Market centers, in a dynamic National Market System, must be able to 
hone a niche, develop a brand, or offer value-added features. Any linkage 
must accommodate innovation and the imperative to compete on the basis of 
value. Moreover, intermarket linkages are not intended to promote unlimited 
free access to a competitor’s market. Why, for example, would anyone 
purchase a seat on the NYSE if a connection to ITS—the listed market 
linkage—offered equivalent benefits? 
The sophistication of brokers in providing linkage to competing markets 
will only expand as technology reveals new possibilities. We can expect 
similar advances in linkages between markets as cutting-edge private sector 
connections between ECNs, for example, continue to develop. In any event, 
we must continue to insist on basic connectivity between markets in pursuit 
of a more effective and more efficient National Market System. Investors 
who put their hard earned dollars in America’s capital markets deserve the 
price efficiency that a more interconnected market provides. 
CONCLUSION 
In many respects, we are at a point of passage for our markets—of what 
they have been, and what they will become. Amidst this transformation, we 
must remain focused on those fundamentals that will best serve investors no 
matter what future course our markets take. Today, with more market centers 
than ever before, transparency and linkages have become even more critical 
to providing those who act on behalf of investors the opportunity and the 
tools to effectively serve their customers. 
The duty of best execution—through transparent pricing and effective 
linkages—must be woven more fully into the fabric of our markets. It must 
be at the very core of our promise of integrity to investors. It must reinforce 
competition—rewarding those markets that improve upon their execution 
quality. As we embark upon what I hope and expect will be a century replete 
with opportunity, innovation and drive, let us continue to embrace these 
principles, not only for the sake of investors, but for the promise of 
America’s markets in tomorrow’s global marketplace. The quality of our 
markets must be our competitive advantage. And nothing honors this 
dedication to quality more than a commitment to achieving the best possible 
execution of any order, by any investor, from anywhere in the world. 
Thank you very much. 
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